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SUFFOCATE OR INNOVATE: AN
OBSERVATION OF CALIFORNIA’S
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
CRYPTOCURRENCY
Jane Kim*
Transactions involving cryptocurrency are rapidly
gaining traction in the United States, prompting the need for
regulation. Hence, California legislators proposed the
cryptocurrency regulation Assembly Bill 1123. However,
based upon the outcome of a virtually identical regulation in
New York, this proposed bill is theoretically projected to
stifle business growth and potential innovation. This Article
focuses on one approach to remedy this by advocating for
reform at the federal level and recommending the utilization
of the regulatory sandbox as a framework for future
regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s generation of instant gratification, the central mission
is often to discover the most convenient method of performing routine
activities. One means to this end is cutting out the time and expense
of the middleman to carry out our tasks, and instead re-establishing
direct control. Concurrently, this would eliminate the need to blindly
invest trust into a third party. In the midst of this ideology and the everdeveloping world of technology, cryptocurrency (virtual currency)
emerged into the limelight.
From its very inception, cryptocurrency was designed to cut out
the middleman by delivering an exceedingly secure exchange of
internet-based virtual currency without an intermediary such as the
bank or government.1 However, with unchecked power comes abuse
of authority. The freedom posed by unregulated virtual currency
transactions soon prompted iniquitous schemes, such as the buying
and selling of illegal commodities, enabled through the use of
cryptocurrency on the dark web.2 The lack of a middleman presented
challenges as more criminal activities involving a cryptocurrency
called Bitcoin3 began to proliferate, compelling the nationwide debate
over the necessity of cryptocurrency regulation.
This Article will examine Assembly Bill 1123 (“A.B. 1123”),
California’s proposed legislation surrounding virtual currency in the
state. The Article argues that although cryptocurrency should be
regulated, A.B. 1123, which requires businesses to obtain a license to
engage in a virtual currency business activity, is much too restrictive.
The California legislators should instead advocate for regulation at the
federal level, utilizing the regulatory sandbox, which allows
innovators to test their business models on actual consumers in a live
environment without the risk of regulation enforcement action, as a

1. Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 53, 55 (2015); see also Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fistful of Bitcoins:
Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names, in IMC ‘13 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013
CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE (2013).
2. Carmine DiPiero, Deciphering Cryptocurrency: Shining a Light on the Deep Dark Web,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2017); see, e.g., Donna Leinwand Leger, How FBI Brought Down
Cyber-Underworld Site Silk Road, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2013, 6:11 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/21/fbi-cracks-silk-road/2984921/.
3. Bitcoin Project 2009–2018, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
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model of implementation.4 Though there are certain limitations
designed to protect consumers and ensure smooth operation of the
sandbox, this controlled environment gives businesses the latitude that
they need to fully develop their innovative product or service.5
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II will discuss what
cryptocurrencies are, specifically Bitcoin and Ethereum, and the
innovative features that establish their marketability. Part III then
focuses on the regulatory framework of virtual currencies in the
United States, addressing general money transmittal laws as well as
New York’s virtual currency law, known as the “BitLicense,”6 which
California’s A.B. 1123 is modeled after. Part IV proposes a
recommended course of action for California and explains how a
transition to regulation at the federal level is conceivable.
The Conclusion further addresses the listed suggestions for
California’s next steps in guiding the future development of regulation
and invites legislators to be cognizant of the systems of regulation
used globally, particularly in regard to the regulatory sandbox.
II. CRYPTOCURRENCY
Cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that is similar to
traditional paper money: they are both a medium of exchange that are
used in the transaction of goods and services.7 However, unlike
traditional currency, cryptocurrency is “untethered to, and
independent from, national borders, central banks, sovereigns, or
fiats.”8 The use and transmission of cryptocurrency occurs among
members of the online community, and ownership of a unit of value is
legitimized and encrypted through cryptography, which protects
against tampering by third parties.9
4. Charlotte Hill, Inside the FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox, LAW360 (Sept. 20, 2016, 10:07
AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/839557/inside-the-fca-s-regulatory-sandbox.
5. Pavel Shoust, Regulators and Fintech: Influence Is Mutual?, ELEC. MONEY,
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/770171476811898530/Session-4-Pavel-Shoust-RegulatorySandboxes-21-09-2016.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
6. Karen Freifeld & Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, New York Regulator Issues Final Virtual
Currency Rules, REUTERS (June 3, 2015, 8:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoinregulation-new-york/new-york-regulator-issues-final-virtual-currency-rulesidUSKBN0OJ23X20150603.
7. Vivian Maese et al., Cryptocurrency: A Primer, 133 BANKING L.J. 468 (2016).
8. Id.
9. Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 504 (2015); see also A.
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A. Bitcoin
Currently, the most prominent cryptocurrency is the Bitcoin.10 To
conceptualize the expeditious price surge of Bitcoin, the initial price,
set in 2010, was less than one cent; by 2017, it exceeded $16,000.11
This digital currency first developed in January 2009, and is an opensource, peer-to-peer, decentralized system.12 Each unit of the virtual
currency is essentially just an entry on a digital ledger.13 Every part of
the transaction is ultimately controlled by the system users, each of
whose identities are encrypted, effectively removing the necessity of
a third-party intermediary.14 Though the users’ personal identities are
encrypted, the transactions themselves are not fully anonymous.15 All
transactions are accounted for and recorded onto a decentralized
public ledger, called the blockchain.16
In a basic transaction, the future owner of the desired Bitcoins
must send his or her public “key” in the form of an algorithm to the
original owner.17 After receiving this algorithm, the original owner
digitally signs the transaction using cryptographic credentials and
transfers the Bitcoins to the future owner.18 These transactions are then
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 713–14 (1995).
10. Josiah Wilmoth, The 3 Most Popular Cryptocurrencies, STRATEGIC COIN,
http://strategiccoin.com/3-popular-cryptocurrencies/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
11. Olga Kharif, All You Need to Know About Bitcoin’s Rise, From $0.01 to $15,000,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 7, 2017, 9:04 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-01/understanding-bitcoin-s-rise-0-01-to-11000-quicktake-q-a.
12. EDWARD V. MURPHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS
AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES (2015) (“[Bitcoin is an] open-source (its controlling computer
code is open to public view), peer-to-peer (transactions do not require a third-party intermediary
such as PayPal or Visa), digital currency (being electronic with no physical manifestation).”); see
also
Julia
Finch,
From
Silk
Road
to
ATMs:
The
History
of
Bitcoin, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2017, 2:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/
sep/13/from-silk-road-to-atms-the-history-of-bitcoin.
13. Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Basics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/bitcoin-basics.html.
14. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 12, at Summary.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1; cf. Andy Greenberg, Your Sloppy Bitcoin Drug Deals Will Haunt You for Years,
WIRED (Jan. 26, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/bitcoin-drug-deals-silk-roadblockchain/ (contending that in numerous cases, researchers can connect someone’s Bitcoin
purchase of a contraband on the dark web to that person’s public account).
17. EUR.
CENT.
BANK,
VIRTUAL
CURRENCY
SCHEMES
23
(2012),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf.
18. Id.
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sent to “miners”19 via the network, who validate the transactions to
prevent fraudulent activity.20 Virtually anybody can be a miner, as
long as he or she has the computing power to unlock transaction data
that is encrypted by a formula, which can only be solved through trialand-error guessing on an extensive scale.21 Being the first to validate
a transaction results in a reward for the miner: a newly issued
Bitcoin.22 This incentive compels individuals to join, support, and
accurately update the network.23 New Bitcoins will be disseminated in
such fashion until there are twenty-one million in circulation around
the world.24
Once a miner validates the transaction and it is verified by fellow
miners, the data becomes part of the blockchain code,25 the “universal
ledger of bitcoin transactions.”26 This forms an encrypted chain of
ownership that is exceedingly difficult to alter or corrupt, ensuring the
trustworthiness of the system.27 Since every block in the chain of
ownership contains communally maintained data that are linked to
earlier blocks, defrauding the system would entail revising countless
links in the chain and evading miners that constantly work to verify
each transaction.28
B. Ethereum
The burgeoning success of the Bitcoin initiated a rapidly evolving
movement in cryptocurrency and inspired the creation of similar
technology—one noteworthy decentralized platform being

19. BITCOIN MINING, https://www.bitcoinmining.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (“Mining
is . . . the mechanism used to introduce Bitcoins into the system: Miners are paid any transaction
fees as well as a ‘subsidy’ of newly created coins.”).
20. Id.
21. Kharif, supra note 11.
22. Id.
23. Popper, supra note 13; see also Daniel Krawisz, The Proof-of-Work Concept, SATOSHI
NAKAMOTO INST. (June 24, 2013), http://nakamotoinstitute.org/mempool/the-proof-of-workconcept/.
24. Popper, supra note 13.
25. Kharif, supra note 11.
26. Francois Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, CHI FED LETTER, Dec. 2013,
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2013/december-317.
27. EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 17, at 23–24.
28. Kharif, supra note 11.
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Ethereum.29 Just as the Bitcoin is its own virtual currency, the “Ether”
is a form of payment that fuels Ethereum, a distributed application
platform, using blockchain technology.30
The distinguishing characteristic of Ethereum is in its application:
the users are provided the possibility to create “smart contracts”—selfexecuting protocols that essentially are agreements built into a
computer code, and consequently stored on a blockchain.31 This
enables developers to “create markets, store registries of debts or
promises, move funds in accordance with instructions given long in
the past (like a will or a futures contract)” without the use of a
middleman or the risk that the counterparty might not uphold their end
of the agreement.32 Smart contracts execute automatically according
to the clauses in the contract when the agreed-upon conditions are
met.33 Additionally, with the imminently extinctive need for attorneys
or notaries, the obligation to wait for papers to be filed or to pay fees
to those that would customarily oversee the transaction also becomes
obsolete.34 Streamlining the process releases consumers from the
constraints of business formalities and reinvents the name of
efficiency.
Ether’s purpose is to facilitate computation of a smart contract on
Ethereum’s platform, while Bitcoin’s function is to serve as a currency
or asset.35 With these new capabilities in the realm of virtual currency,
the discussion of how to regulate such activity becomes increasingly
important.

29. ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (“Ethereum is a decentralized
platform that runs smart contracts: applications that run exactly as programmed without any
possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third-party interference.”).
30. Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the Power of Blockchain
Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 334, 354 (2017).
31. Id.; Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
263, 263 (2017).
32. ETHEREUM, supra note 29.
33. What Is Ethereum? How Does It Work?, THE ECON. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:53 PM),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/what-is-ethereum-how-does-itwork/articleshow/62169759.cms.
34. Jon Martindale, What Is Ethereum?, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 9, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/what-is-ethereum/.
35. ETHER
The
Crypto-fuel
for
the
Ethereum
Network,
ETHEREUM,
https://ethereum.org/ether (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
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III. SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
RELATED TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
authority to not only coin money, but also to regulate its value.36 While
federal regulators are carefully assessing ways to confront the
increasingly emphatic presence of virtual currency, law enforcement
agencies are pressured into promptly producing solutions in light of
the abuses and criminal activity involving digital currencies.37 In a
June 26, 2015 speech at the American Bar Association’s National
Institute on Bitcoin and Other Digital Currencies, Assistant Attorney
General Caldwell stated:
[V]irtual currency facilitates a wide range of traditional
criminal activities as well as sophisticated cybercrime
schemes. Much of the illicit conduct involving virtual
currency occurs through online black markets such as the
now-shuttered Silk Road, which operated on an anonymized
“dark web” network that masked users’ physical locations,
making them difficult to track. Similar online black markets
continue to operate, offering on a global scale, a wide
selection of illicit goods and services. While these have
included more traditional crimes such as narcotics
trafficking, stolen credit card information, and hit-men for
hire, we have also seen a significant evolution in criminal
activity . . . [such as] fund[ing] the production of child
exploitation through online crowd-sourcing.38
This statement demonstrates the extent to which individuals will go in
a world free from government regulation and oversight, while
concurrently emphasizing the importance of regulation.
To expand on the illegalities that surround cryptocurrency, in
2011, Ross Ulbricht founded the most notorious digital black market,

36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
37. See Jason Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other Cryptocurrency to Commit Crimes? Law
Enforcement Is onto You, FORBES (Dec. 28, 2017, 12:18 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/12/28/using-bitcoin-or-other-cryptocurrencyto-commit-crimes-law-enforcement-is-onto-you/#7dc9c16e3bdc.
38. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell
Delivers Remarks at the ABA’s National Institute on Bitcoin and Other Digital Currencies
(June 26, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwelldelivers-remarks-aba-s-national-institute.
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termed the Silk Road, containing almost every conceivable
contraband.39 It utilized Bitcoins to facilitate the marketplace, which
was a haven for drug dealers, arms dealers, and document forgers.40
The Silk Road was designed to be a free market outside the scope of
government control, enabling the users to purchase contraband
relatively anonymously.41 Although not completely untraceable
because every transaction is recorded onto the blockchain, Bitcoin
offered the level of anonymity that surpassed credit card transactions
and other forms of currency, augmenting the Silk Road’s appeal for
consumers in the black market.42 Within two and half years, the Silk
Road became a hub for more than $1.2 billion worth of transactions, a
substantial amount of which was used for heroin, cocaine, and lyseric
acid diethylamide, more commonly known as LSD.43 Eventually, in
2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation tracked down Ulbricht and
charged him for narcotics trafficking, computer hacking, and money
laundering.44 Instances such as these illustrate the significance of
regulation and highlight legislators’ need to take swift action.
The existing federal regulatory structure includes anti-money
laundering statutes and money transmission laws.45 The Bank Secrecy
Act, which was the first major money laundering law in the United
States, requires financial institutions, individuals, and banks to record
information regarding particular customer transactions into Currency
Transaction Reports.46 The reports must include information regarding
deposits, withdrawals, and currency exchanges for transactions
39. Andrew Norry, The History of Silk Road: A Tale of Drugs, Extortion & Bitcoin,
BLOCKONOMI (Nov. 20, 2018), https://blockonomi.com/history-of-silk-road/.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 16.
42. Norry, supra note 39.
43. David Segal, Eagle Scout. Idealist. Drug Trafficker?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/business/eagle-scout-idealist-drug-trafficker.html.; see also
Joseph Goldstein, Arrest in U.S. Shuts Down a Black Market for Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/nyregion/operator-of-online-market-forillegal-drugs-is-charged-fbi-says.html?_r=0.
44. Tim Hume, How FBI Caught Ross Ulbricht, Alleged Creator of Criminal Marketplace
Silk
Road,
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/04/world/americas/silk-road-rossulbricht/index.html (last updated Oct. 5, 2013).
45. Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money
Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529, 537 (2014).
46. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012); History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-moneylaundering-laws (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
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amounting to more than $10,000.47 By gathering information on the
source, volume, and movement of currency, the reports allow law
enforcement agencies to track large sums of money that could
potentially be used for illicit activity.48 Additionally, the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1956 criminalizes, at the federal level,
those involved in financial transactions that represent unlawful
activity.49
In adopting this regulatory framework to the realm of
cryptocurrency, the United States Treasury Department’s Financial
Crime Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) broadened the applicability
of the federal Bank Secrecy Act to cover virtual currency transactions
in 2013.50 FinCEN defines a money transmission service as
“acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for
currency from one person and the transmission of currency, funds or
other value that substitutes currency to another location or person by
any means.”51 This applies to persons or businesses that create, accept,
distribute, exchange, or transmit virtual currencies.52
Additionally, the Bitcoin administrators and exchangers that, in
fact, accept, transmit, buy, or sell virtual currency are considered
money transmitters—persons that engage in the transfer of funds by
accepting or transmitting anything of value, whether it be real
currencies or virtual currencies—whom must comply with the
Treasury Department’s registration processes.53 Beyond such
guidance, “[f]ederal agencies moved cautiously with no plans to
embark on a systematic regulatory scheme for cryptocurrencies.”54
As the current money transmission and anti-money laundering
statutes prove insufficient to placate the criminal threats posed by the
existence of virtual currency, states proposed cryptocurrency-specific
licensing requirements to heighten oversight. Each state has the

47. Penrose, supra note 45, at 537.
48. Id.
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b) (2012).
50. See Memorandum from Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network on Application
of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies,
(Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 9, at 509.
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discretion to create and interpret virtual currency laws;55 this results in
a divergence of whether licenses are required when engaging in virtual
currency transactions between states. Among those that have
commenced the push for licensure, New York and California are
noteworthy states.
A. New York BitLicense
New York’s Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) was the
pioneer that pushed other states’ inclination towards adopting their
own respective cryptocurrency regulations. NYDFS promulgated the
“BitLicense” for regulating virtual currency businesses on
June 3, 2015.56 These regulations were “intended to provide
prudential licensing and regulations for cryptocurrency market
participants and consumer protection . . . [from] cyber security issues
surrounding the use of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.”57
Although the final proposal contains provisions on an expansive
breadth of subjects, including licensure, capital requirements, and
cybersecurity program requirements, this analysis will only focus on
the basic principal features.58
The BitLicense defines virtual currency as “any type of digital
unit that is used as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored
value.”59 Though it provides a broad latitude of interpretation, it does
not include digital units that are handled exclusively on online gaming
platforms, units that can be redeemed for goods or services, or used as
gift cards.60
The central groundwork of the BitLicense requires anyone
determined to engage in “virtual currency business activity” to not
only obtain a license, but also to file financial reports, subject
themselves to potential examination, manage their records, and satisfy
specific capital requirements.61 Those who obtain licenses are then
55. James Gatto & Elsa S. Broeker, Bitcoin and Beyond: Current and Future Regulation of
Virtual Currencies, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429, 452–53 (2015).
56. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200 (2015).
57. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 9, at 536.
58. Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses, 37 N.Y. Reg. 7 (June 24, 2015)
(to be codified at N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, pt. 200), http://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/
register/2015/june24/pdf/rulemaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR2P-KCCU].
59. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(p).
60. Id.§ 200.2(p)(1), (p)(2).
61. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 9, at 537.
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additionally required to safeguard their customers’ interests by: (1)
maintaining sufficient capital to ensure the financial integrity of the
licensee;62 (2) preserving a surety bond or trust account for the
customer’s benefit;63 and (3) refraining from selling, transferring, or
otherwise using assets on behalf of another unless at that person’s
direction.64
In clarifying the terms of a virtual currency business activity,
NYDFS set the parameters for activities involving New York or a New
York Resident to include:
(1) receiving Virtual Currency for Transmission or
Transmitting Virtual Currency . . . .;
(2) storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of
Virtual Currency on behalf of others;
(3) buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer
business;
(4) performing Exchange Services as a customer business;
or
(5) controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual
Currency.65
These parameters constructed the model by which subsequent states
would frame their virtual currency legislation.
B. California’s Proposed Legislation for Virtual Currency
The first prototype of cryptocurrency regulation in California was
Assembly Bill 1326 (“A.B. 1326”), introduced in February 2015.66
After becoming an inactive file due to heavy opposition, it was reactivated in 2016 and, again, denied.67 Assembly Member Matthew
Dababneh’s groundwork for this bill included the Money
Transmissions Act and the New York BitLicense, used as model
platforms.68

62. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.8(a).
63. Id. § 200.9(a), (b).
64. Id. § 200.9(c).
65. Id. § 200.2(q).
66. Assemb. B. 1326,
2015–2016
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess. (Cal.
2015),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1326.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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A.B. 1326, which would have enacted the Digital Currency
Business Enrollment Program, was devised based upon the Money
Transmission Act’s concept, requiring any person engaging in the
business of money transmission to obtain a license from the
Commissioner of Business Oversight (“Commissioner”) by paying a
fee and completing an application form.69 The bill defined digital
currency as a “digital representation of value that can be digitally
traded and is used to facilitate the sale, purchase, and exchange of
goods, or other digital representations of value.”70 It further defined a
digital currency business as “offering or providing the service of
storing, transmitting, exchanging, or issuing digital currency.”71 This
not only would have applied to business entities, however organized,
but also to individuals that engaged in such actions.72 Essentially,
those seeking enrollment were, among numerous other preconditions,
required to pay a non-refundable fee of up to $5,000, along with an
annual fee of $2,500, supply specified personal and business
information in an application form, and provide fingerprints to be
delivered to law enforcement.73 Without enrolling in the program, a
person would be prohibited from engaging in the digital currency
business altogether.74
Furthermore, the bill constrained users in a number of ways.
Namely, it prohibited an enrollee from advertising products or services
without issuing a statement regarding the program and obtaining
approval from a government agency.75 The bill also required the
enrollee to make a “variety of specified disclosures” to customers prior
to each transaction, and then provide a receipt with particular
information after such transaction.76 As in the New York BitLicense,
this bill would additionally require the enrollee and its agents to
subject themselves to investigation, and if found to be in violation of
the provisions of the program, the Commissioner would have the
authority to issue cease and desist orders.77
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Faced with immediate resistance, principally from advocates of
virtual currency, California was unsuccessful in implementing this
regulation.78 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a prominent
proponent for innovation in the digital world, cited numerous issues
inherent in A.B. 1326.79 These include that first, the bill is premature,
since the digital currency industry is still in its developing stages.80
Burdensome legislation could have unintentional, long-term
consequences that potentially disadvantage consumers more than it
benefits them.81 Second, the bill’s definition of “virtual currency
business” is vague, deterring potential innovative businesses from
launching.82 Third, the application requires extensive data from the
applicant that is largely irrelevant to the targeted ideals of protecting
consumers and facilitating the smooth application of virtual
currency.83 And finally, the bill’s imposition of distinctive regulations
per state could create confusion for consumers and leave them in a
myriad of legal uncertainties, particularly because the fundamental
characteristic of virtual currency is that it transcends state borders.84
However, with the burgeoning presence of virtual currency coupled
with the increasingly pressing need to regulate, Assembly Member
Dababneh was persistent in proposing a “lasting regulatory framework
that protects consumers and allows this industry to thrive,” inspiring
Assembly Bill 1123.85
Despite the heavy opposition to the original bill, the new
California BitLicense bill renders the same requirements and
philosophy as the previous proposals.86 A.B. 1123 would enact the
78. Joseph Young, EFF Opposes California’s Impractical Bitcoin Regulation BitLicense,
COIN TEL. (May 4, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/eff-opposes-californias-impracticalbitcoin-regulation-bitlicense.
79. Rainey Reitman, A License to Kill Innovation: Why A.B. 1326—California’s Bitcoin
License—Is Bad for Business, Innovation, and Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/08/license-kill-innovation-why-ab-1326-californias-bitcoinlicense-bad-business.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Matthew Dababneh, Assemblymember Dababneh Issues Statement on the Regulation of
Virtual Currency, ASSEMBLYMEMBER MATTHEW DABABNEH (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://a45.asmdc.org/press-release/assemblymember-dababneh-issues-statement-regulationvirtual-currency [http://perma.cc/LFJ3-XQKF].
86. Young, supra note 78.
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Virtual Currency Act, which still requires a license from the
Commissioner for those that desire to engage in the virtual currency
business.87
The bill establishes a new definition for the term virtual currency,
which is “any type of digital unit that is used as a medium of exchange
or a form of digitally stored value.”88 This is identical to the definition
written in the New York BitLicense.89 Further, “virtual currency
business” is now represented as “maintaining full custody or control
of virtual currency in this state on behalf of others.”90
Aside from these differences, the foundational structure remains
virtually the same as A.B. 1326 with only slight modifications.91
Applicants for licensure must pay a nonrefundable application fee and
complete an application form that requires additional information
beyond those listed in A.B. 1326.92 These include data regarding prior
virtual currency services, a sample form of receipt for future
transactions involving money received in virtual currency, a
description of the applicant’s source of credit and money used to
provide virtual currency services, and financial statements.93
Further, in addition to annual fees remaining in place, licensees
are required to make supplementary payments for the Commissioner’s
expenses in administering the regulatory provisions of the bill.94 This
includes periodic examinations of businesses to ascertain whether the
owner is lawfully conducting his or her business and is maintaining
proper records of all virtual currency activity.95
In addressing further provisions purported to protect consumers,
this version of the bill mimics the New York BitLicense:
This bill would require each licensee to maintain at all times
such capital as the commissioner determines, subject to
specified factors, is sufficient to ensure the safety and
87. Assemb. B. 1123,
2017–2018
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess. (Cal.
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1123.
88. Id.
89. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(p) (2015).
90. Assemb.
B.
1123,
2017–2018
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess. (Cal.
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1123.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.

2017),

2017),
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soundness of the licensee, its ongoing operations, and
maintain consumer protection. The bill would require each
licensee to maintain a bond or trust account in United States
dollars for the benefit of its consumers in the form and
amount as specified by the commissioner.96
To determine the minimum amount of capital that must be
maintained, the Commissioner considers factors such as the
composition of the licensee’s total assets and liabilities, the expected
volume of the particular virtual business activity, the amount of
leverage employed, and the liquidity position of the licensee.97
The provisions addressing random investigation by the
Commissioner to ascertain whether the business complies with all
laws, the Commissioner’s authority to impose penalties, including
suspending or revoking licenses, and reports of specified disclosures
to its consumers, remain almost identical to A.B. 1326.98
C. Effects of the New York BitLicense
Because California’s proposed legislation modeled itself after the
New York BitLicense, it is important to examine the advent and
implementation of the New York BitLicense in 2015. The “prudential
licensing” that New York lawmakers vowed to implement has,
contrary to its intention, staunched business growth of cryptocurrency,
leading to what is being referred to as the “bitcoin exodus.”99 The
appeal of the BitLicense’s clear regulatory framework for
cryptocurrency quickly diminished due to the sluggish licensing
process as well as the rigidly restrictive requirements, which began
driving companies away.100

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also JP Buntinx, California’s Version of BitLicense Returns as Legal Proposal,
NEWSBTC (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.newsbtc.com/2017/04/25/californias-versionbitlicense-returns-legislative-proposal-ab-1123/.
99. Michael del Castillo, The Next ‘BitLicense’ Will Impact All of Wall Street, N.Y. BUS. J.
(Jan. 26, 2016, 10:09 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2016/01/26/the-nextbitlicense-will-impact-all-of-wall-street.html; see also Daniel Roberts, Behind the “Exodus” of
Bitcoin Startups from New York, FORTUNE (Aug. 14, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/08/14/bitcoin-startups-leave-new-york-bitlicense/.
100. Suzanne Barlyn, New York’s Bitcoin Hub Dreams Fade with Licensing Backlog, REUTERS
(Oct. 30, 2016, 10:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-regulations-dfs/new-yorksbitcoin-hub-dreams-fade-with-licensing-backlog-idUSKBN12V0CM.
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Key members of the NYDFS, such as then-head of the department
Benjamin Lawksy, who were responsible for the very development
and design of the New York BitLicense, left the regulatory agency
soon after the BitLicense’s implementation.101 Without the drafters’
guidance, the already stagnant license approval process was
exacerbated by uncertainty on how the regulation should be
enforced.102
This uncertainty diverted companies from seeking approval or
from even launching, consequently impeding the momentum of
business innovation.103 More than a year since the implementation of
the BitLicense, only two BitLicenses were issued, with fifteen
applications pending, four withdrawn, and four denied.104 Companies
already operating at the time the law came into effect continued to
conduct their businesses while waiting for a license, but the risks
imposed by the BitLicense inevitably thwarted efforts to raise capital
or expand, especially for start-up companies.105
The application process also proved exceptionally onerous for
smaller companies lacking in resources.106 As intimated in Part III.A,
the BitLicense costs $5,000 just to apply. The application can easily
exceed five hundred pages, requiring copies of fingerprints, business
models, ownership and personal information, and other documents
often difficult to obtain.107 In large part due to the licensing backlog
and the monetary and time-consuming burdens posed by the
application, many companies announced their departure from New
York, including Kraken, GoCoin, LocalBitcoins, and Genesis
Mining.108 Genesis Mining, a cloud mining company, issued a
statement that explicitly denounced the BitLicense:
[The BitLicense is] complex, expensive, and comes with a
set of guidelines that make it nearly impossible for any
startup to comply with . . . . Genesis Mining will not be able
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.8(a) (2015).
Grace Caffyn, Genesis Mining Leaves New York Following BitLicense Deadline,
COINDESK (Oct. 23, 2015, 5:24 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/genesis-mining-leaves-new-yorkfollowing-bitlicense-deadline/.
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to comply with the regulations set forth by the proposed
BitLicense and as such, we will no longer be able to accept
customers from the state of New York. All current customers
will be able to continue their services, but going forward, no
one with an IP address from the state of New York will be
able to purchase hashpower contracts with us.109
Kraken, a bitcoin exchange company, also commented before
withdrawing its services from New York, stating that the BitLicense’s
tolls exceeded the market opportunity of providing its business to New
York residents.110
IV. PROPOSAL FOR CALIFORNIA’S NEXT STEP
Because California’s Assembly Bill 1123 is nearly identical to the
New York BitLicense,111 even mirroring much of the same language,
the probability that A.B. 1123 will follow the same trajectory is
considerably high. The same overbearing regulations and application
costs will likely cause yet another “bitcoin exodus.” As state
regulations follow a misconceived path, with New York spearheading
the regulation efforts, the cryptocurrency industry’s future projections
are ominous. As happened in New York, companies will potentially
relocate to different states until they find a regulation that is agreeable
with their own terms.112
Moreover, allowing states to draft their own respective
regulations has “resulted in a veritable patchwork of cryptoambivalent, crypto-friendly, crypto-hostile, and crypto-indifferent

109. Bitlicense: Red Flag Acts of Our Era, GENESIS MINING (Dec. 8, 2015),
http://blog.genesis-mining.com/bitlicense-red-flag-acts-of-our-era; see generally GENESIS
MINING, https://www.genesis-mining.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
110. Charlie McCombie, Eight Months Since BitLicense’s Inception, Only One License Has
Been Granted, COIN TEL. (Mar. 25, 2016), https://cointelegraph.com/news/eight-months-sincebitlicenses-inception-only-one-license-has-been-granted; see generally KRAKEN BITCOIN EXCH.,
https://www.kraken.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
111. Michael Scott, How Five States Are Approaching Bitcoin Regulation, BITCOIN MAG.
(May 15, 2015, 9:52 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/how-five-states-are-approachingbitcoin-regulation/. Compare Assemb. B. 1326, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1326, with
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 23, § 200.8(a) (2015).
112. See generally Caffyn, supra note 108.
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[states].”113 This lack of a uniform legal framework in the United
States has not only deterred cryptocurrency businesses from
establishing their roots in a single state, but it has also exacerbated
problems of theft and fraud.114 As deference is currently given to each
state, the U.S. government has a limited ability to protect users.115 A
uniformity in rules would consequently allay blockchain companies’
concerns of erratic and oppressive policy changes, and provide for
easier administrability of regulations put in place as safeguards from
theft.116
In light of the predictably unpromising effects of the proposed
regulations, California legislators need to consider options that are
more beneficial to the collective financial technology industry in the
United States. Accordingly, California should reject the proposed
legislation, and instead, the state legislators and commentators should
advocate for reform at the federal level, in consonance with what other
countries have done.
In numerous countries, federal agencies play a significant role in
administering the financial technology industry, many of which utilize
an effective tool for regulation called the regulatory sandbox.117 The
regulatory sandbox is a compelling example of the way the United
States could implement regulation at the federal level. With this, not
only would all states follow the same standard, but the regulatory
sandbox would also promote innovation, rather than create regulatory
barriers.
A. Regulatory Sandbox
The regulatory sandbox is a “safe space” where firms can test
their services, products, and business models on real consumers
without being subjected to the standard burden of regulation and its
113. Rachel McIntosh, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Crypto Regulation in the USA, FIN.
MAGNATES (Sept 1, 2018, 9:14 AM),
https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/good-bad-ugly-crypto-regulation-usa/.
114. Id.; see, e.g., Aziz Abdel-Qader, Tether, Bitstamp Most Likely Hacked by the Same Person,
FIN. MAGNATES (Nov. 21, 2017, 9:38 PM),
https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/tether-bitstamp-huobi-likely-hackedperson/.
115. See McIntosh, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX NOVEMBER 2015, 5–6 (2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf.
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consequences.118 The term “sandbox” originates from the software
development sphere: it is a “tool that allows developers to test a
technological proof of concept prior to a full-scale public release.”119
This gives the developers an opportunity to make amendments to their
product based on consumer feedback before any foreseeable
circumstance invalidates their product.120 The sandbox concept would
be directly adopted by firms entering the financial services market,
enabling them to test their ideas in a controlled environment without
risking the current financial system or jeopardizing consumer
protection.121 Essentially, it is a vacuum for potential missteps and
mismanagement for firms that are in the embryonic stages of
launching.122
In addition to assessing “the impact of regulations on [each
firm’s] profitability and overall business model,” this process provides
assurance to potential risk-adverse investors that it is a tested and
reliable model.123 The sandbox delivers an ideal juxtaposition of
increased investments and decreased compliance costs.124 The
insulated environment protects institutions from the risk of being
heavily fined for financial misconduct and from lack of riskmanagement practices.125 This not only facilitates support for start-up
companies, but also encourages established firms to introduce
innovative commodities that may not yet comply with existing
regulations.126 Consequently, the regulatory sandbox will foster
innovation by ensuring a protected sphere for those that are hesitant to
unveil their product or service due to regulatory uncertainty.127
Regulators, however, do need to take certain precautions:

118. Hill, supra note 4.
119. FinTech and Regulatory Sandboxes in the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, SIDLEY
AUSTIN LLP (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2017/09/fintechand-regulatory-sandboxes.
120. Id.
121. Id.; VAIBHAV ANAND & SANJEEV SHAH, DELOITTE, Regulatory Sandbox Making India a
Global Fintech Hub 16 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/
technology-media-telecommunications/in-tmt-fintech-regulatory-sandbox-web.pdf.
122. See FinTech and Regulatory Sandboxes in the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, supra note
119.
123. ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121, at 16.
124. Id. at 21.
125. Id.
126. FinTech and Regulatory Sandboxes in the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, supra note 119.
127. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 5.
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While there are good reasons to explore regulatory
sandboxes, policy makers should be prepared to face
challenges. Most importantly, operating a regulatory
sandbox requires adequate human and financial resources to
select proposals, provide guidance, oversee experiments and
evaluate innovations. Regulators may lack these resources in
many [emerging markets and developing economy]
countries. Therefore, policy makers need to pay attention to
details and carefully consider their options.128
In analyzing the application of a new regulatory scheme, countries
need to be wary of the weight of responsibility inherent in the sandbox.
As aforementioned, important factors to acknowledge when
examining the viability of implementing a regulatory sandbox include
the amount of financial resources, as well as the manpower it takes to
carry out the tasks that the sandbox requires.
1. How the Sandbox Operates
The basic operation of a regulatory sandbox is as follows: first,
the regulator develops broad guidelines and expectations—a tailored
regulatory framework—along with threshold eligibility requirements
for the firms that desire to participate.129 These requirements generally
include the foundational guidelines of genuine and novel innovation,
direct consumer benefit, extensive scope of potential support to
consumers within the financial services industry, a legitimate need for
testing within the sandbox, and testing readiness from completed
research regarding risks and regulations.130 A public notice is then
circulated, inviting firms to apply to participate in the regulatory
sandbox.131 The regulatory agency then carefully evaluates the
applications based on their business model or product offering, and on
how well the firms conform to the above-mentioned eligibility
criteria.132
128. Ivo Jenik, Regulatory Sandboxes: Potential for Financial Inclusion?, CGAP
(Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.cgap.org/blog/regulatory-sandboxes-potential-financial-inclusion.
129. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX LESSONS LEARNED REPORT OCTOBER
2017 4 (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-lessonslearned-report.pdf.; ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121.
130. ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121, at 16-20; see, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note
129; see also Hill, supra note 4.
131. ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121.
132. Id.
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From the applicant pool, a limited amount of companies are then
selected to participate for a specified period of time, during which they
test their product or service in a live environment and collaborate
closely with the regulators to determine the salability of the
commodity.133 The regulators also work individually with the firm to
explain how they would “interpret the requirements in the context of
[the firm’s] specific test.”134 Once a firm successfully exits the
sandbox, they must submit a report addressing the outcomes of the
testing; if they subsequently choose to deploy their product into the
financial market, their product or service must then adhere to all the
established regulations.135
a. Countries that have implemented the regulatory sandbox
Numerous countries have implemented a regulatory sandbox, of
which the major players include the United Kingdom, Australia,
Singapore, and Hong Kong.
i. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), a
regulatory body for the financial market, initiated the regulatory
sandbox program as part of a broader initiative, Project Innovate, to
“foster competition and growth in financial services by supporting
both small and large businesses that are developing products and
services that could genuinely improve consumers’ experience and
outcomes.”136 The FCA introduced the default parameters for
regulatory sandbox testing.137 These include:
(a) Duration: The appropriate duration for testing is three to
six months.
(b) Number of Customers: Customer set considerations
should balance the ability to obtain statistically relevant data
with the possibility of risk to customers.

133. Id.
134. Sandbox Tools, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatorysandbox/sandbox-tools (Dec. 15, 2017).
135. ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121; see also FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 1.
136. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 1.
137. Hill, supra note 4.
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(c) Customer Selection: The firms must source appropriate
customers themselves, taking into account the type of
service, the intended market, and the potential risks involved.
(d) Customer Safeguards: The customer safeguards are
determined on a case-by-case basis—the FCA usually takes
into consideration the type of customers, the technicalities of
the trial, as well as the magnitude of risk.
(e) Disclosure: The firms offering informed consent should
disclose information regarding the test and its compensation.
(f) Testing Plans: These should include the timeline of the
test, their measures of success, the testing parameters,
appropriate customer safeguards, risk assessment, and an exit
strategy for the consumers.138
Furthermore, the FCA offers three risk-management tools to
provide regulatory relief.139 First, the regulators can provide individual
guidance on the interpretation of the relevant rules, tailored to the firm
and its operation.140 If the firm conforms with the given instruction,
“the FCA will proceed on the basis that they have complied with the
relevant aspects of [the FCA’s] rules to which the guidance relates.”141
Second, the FCA can utilize the power to waive or modify the rules.
If the testing activities do not comply with the rules because they
would be “unduly burdensome,” the regulator can issue a waiver, as
long as it does not adversely affect the progress of the FCA’s
objectives.142 However, there is a limitation to the waiver: it cannot
violate the bounds of the existing European Union legislation.143
Changes to the United Kingdom’s legislation are not made for the
sandbox’s operation.
Lastly, for cases in which the first two options are not viable, the
FCA can issue a “no enforcement action letter,” stating that “no FCA
enforcement action will be taken against testing activities where [the
138. Default Standards for Sandbox Testing Parameters, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/default-standards-for-sandbox-testing-parameters.pdf
(last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
139. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 9.
140. Id.
141. Christopher Woolard, Dir. of Strategy & Competition, Fin. Conduct Auth., Speech at the
Innovate Finance Global Summit (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/innovate-finance-global-summit.
142. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 9 n.8.
143. Id. at 9.
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FCA is] reasonably satisfied that the activities do not breach [the
FCA’s] requirements or harm [the FCA’s] objectives.”144 The
assurance of no disciplinary action only applies for the duration of the
sandbox testing period.145
Upon observation of the regulatory sandbox’s legitimate
application, in the first two cohorts, fifty applications of 146 were
accepted, and forty-one were actually tested within the first year of the
sandbox operation.146 Distributed ledger technology, such as the
blockchain, was the most prominently employed technology within
the first two cohorts, with seventeen firms applying the technology in
some fashion, usually in electronic money institutions.147
To illustrate, Billion, one of the selected companies, is an
electronic money platform that uses blockchain technology to transfer
and hold funds securely using a phone application, and BitX is a
cryptocurrency transfer service and trading platform.148 The FCA
acknowledged the benefit of these services—faster transaction times
and manageable exchange rates—but also made sure to protect the
consumers participating in the sandbox process by requiring the firms
to have full refunds readily available in the event that the currency was
lost in transmission.149
Overall, from the first cohort, 75% of the firms successfully
completed the testing, and 90% of those firms attempted to institute
their business in the broader financial market.150 Approximately onethird of the tested firms made substantial adjustments to their business
models, such as more nuanced consumer protection safeguards, after
utilizing knowledge procured from the sandbox process.151 Though it
is too premature in the process to make conclusive judgments
regarding the regulatory sandbox’s impact on the overall market, the
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 129, at 6; see also Dan Cummings, FCA Testing
Blockchain Technology in Pilot Program, ETHNEWS (Feb. 16, 2017, 11:44 AM),
https://www.ethnews.com/fca-testing-blockchain-technology-in-pilot-program (describing the
number of applications and the companies selected for the FCA’s first cohort).
147. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 129, at 9; see also Cummings, supra note 146 (listing
the nine blockchain-based companies that participated in the first cohort).
148. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX – Cohort 1, https://www.fca.org.uk/
firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-1 (June 15, 2017); Cummings, supra note 146.
149. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 129, at 10–11.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6.
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FCA stated that the testing does indicate promising progress towards
greater competition and a higher quality output of products and
services.152
ii. Australia
Australia’s regulatory sandbox framework is administered by the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s (ASIC)
Innovation Hub.153 ASIC is an independent commonwealth
government body that regulates corporate, markets, financial services
and consumer credit,154 while their Innovation Hub was specifically
created to aid financial technology companies in navigating the
regulatory system.155 ASIC provides mechanisms of relief in a format
very similar to the FCA’s regulatory sandbox.
Within the “fintech licensing exemption,”156 offered only to
specified products and services,157 ASIC provides a waiver, allowing
financial technology businesses to participate in the regulatory
sandbox without any required license for a maximum of twelve
months.158 There is no application process—as long as the business
meets the eligibility requirements and adheres to the conditions of the
sandbox, the company is legally entitled to rely on this exemption.159
These conditions do not veer far from the default standards set out in

152. Id. at 10.
153. Regulatory Sandbox, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, http://asic.gov.au/for-business/yourbusiness/innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
154. Our Role, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/ourrole/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
155. Innovation Hub, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, http://asic.gov.au/for-business/yourbusiness/innovation-hub/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
156. AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N., REGULATORY GUIDE 257: TESTING FINTECH PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES WITHOUT HOLDING AN AFS OR CREDIT LICENSE 14 (2017),
https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4420907/rg257-published-23-august-2017.pdf (“[W]e have
made ASIC Corporations (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption) Instrument 2016/1175 and
ASIC Credit (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption) Instrument 2016/1176, which allow
eligible businesses to test certain products and services for 12 months without needing to obtain an
AFS licence or credit licence, respectively. Collectively, we refer to these instruments as the
‘fintech licensing exemption.’”).
157. Id. at 17–19.
158. Licensing Exemption for Fintech Testing, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N (Aug. 2017),
https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4112096/licensing-exemption-for-fintech-testinginfographic.pdf; Regulatory Sandbox, supra note 153 (explaining that two other options for testing
the product or service, include relying on existing statutory exemptions, or otherwise on individual
relief from ASIC for other services).
159. Innovation Hub, supra note 156, at 14.
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the United Kingdom’s regulatory sandbox; they include a limit of one
hundred retail clients, sufficient compensation arrangements in the
case of loss, a dispute resolution system, exposure limits, and
consumer protection measures.160 The protection measures entail full
disclosure to the clients if the business does not have a license, if the
services provided are being tested under the fintech licensing
exemption, or if the regular protections when dealing with services
provided from a licensee do not apply.161
iii. Singapore
In implementing the regulatory sandbox, the Monetary Authority
of Singapore’s (MAS) target audience was financial technology firms,
financial institutions, and professional service firms that endorsed
such businesses.162 The evaluation criteria used to assess each
application is, again, very similar to those of the United Kingdom: the
proposed financial service should involve innovative technology and
aim to fix a problem or provide a benefit; the applicant should intend
to deploy the service or product beyond the parameters of the sandbox;
the testing scenarios, boundary conditions, and desired outcomes must
be defined; the company must be cognizant of and consequently
mitigate the potential risks; an exit strategy must be planned in case of
discontinuation; and a transition strategy should be defined in case of
conversion to the broader financial market.163
With this implementation, the Singaporean government made a
clear statement that it was a proponent of financial technology
innovation.164 Although this statement encourages investments for
innovation and attracts start-up companies to penetrate the Southeast
Asian market, it comes at a cost.165 The MAS stated that it would
expend $166 million over five years towards the creation of innovation

160. Id.
161. Id. at 23.
162. MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOX GUIDELINES, 4 (2016),
https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/Smart-Financial-Centre/Sandbox/FinTech-RegulatorySandbox-Guidelines19Feb2018.pdf?la=en&hash=1F4AA49087F9689249FB8816A11AEAA6CB3DE833
163. Id. at 5–6.
164. Don Weinland, Hong Kong to Create Fintech ‘Sandbox’ Allowing Bank Experiments, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/38a662ee-740f-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.
165. Id.
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centers and technology projects, effectively spearheading its efforts
into becoming a viable adversary of the technology revolution.166
iv. Hong Kong
Less than three months after Singapore introduced the regulatory
sandbox, its “regional rival,” Hong Kong, announced its participation
in the same program to preserve its reputation as a relevant competitor
in the financial technology sphere.167 The Hong Kong Monetary
Authority (HKMA) launched the Fintech Supervisory Sandbox, but
departed from the typical layout.168 The program is “only offered to
established banks seeking to explore distributed ledger technology and
fintech solutions.”169 Start-up companies are generally not accepted,
unless they partner with an existing authorized banking service.170
The baseline safeguards of setting boundaries for the trial run,
incorporating customer protection measures, being aware of and
mitigating the risks, and readiness for testing are all still maintained.171
Once the bank or company is a participant of the sandbox, the
innovators have considerable regulatory room for modifying their
product or service; the HKMA does not intend to impose an extensive
list of supervisory requirements onto the participants.172
B. Federal Regulation in the United States
There are several United States federal regulatory agencies that
are virtually equivalent to the FCA in the United Kingdom, ASIC in
Australia, MAS in Singapore, and HKMA in Hong Kong, which can
potentially operate the regulatory sandbox. Specifically, either the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Dan Cummings, Regulatory Sandboxes: A Practice for Innovation that Is Trending
Worldwide, ETHNEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 5:10 PM), https://www.ethnews.com/regulatorysandboxes-a-practice-for-innovation-that-is-trending-worldwide.
169. Id.
170. See id.; Fintech Supervisory SandBox (FSS), H.K. MONETARY AUTH.,
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/fintech-supervisorysandbox.shtml (last updated Oct. 2, 2018); see generally Letter from Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief
Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, to Chief Executive of all Authorized Institutions
(Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-andcircular/2016/20160906e1.pdf.
171. Fintech Supervisory SandBox (FSS), supra note 170.
172. Letter from Arthur Yuen, supra note 170.

(9) 52.3_KIM (DO NOT DELETE)

366

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

12/2/2019 11:17 PM

[Vol. 52:339

United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are
feasible candidates.
The SEC’s mission is to oversee the markets, facilitate capital
information, and to protect investors.173 In the midst of this, the SEC
has recognized that cryptocurrency is gaining widespread recognition;
however, the SEC “has not to date approved for listing and trading any
exchange-traded products . . . holding cryptocurrencies or other assets
related to cryptocurrencies.”174 This is not to say that cryptocurrency
does not fall within the SEC’s purview—the SEC issued an
investigative report stating that the sale of digital assets by virtual
organizations utilizing blockchain technology fall under the federal
securities law.175 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has also made it clear
that the SEC will keep “sharp focus” on how cryptocurrencies affect
the securities markets.176 This focus on the market has already lead the
SEC to take action in a specific case, temporarily suspending trading
in shares of The Crypto Company, a company that provides the public
direct exposure to global blockchain development growth,177 whose
stock surged more than 2,700% in one month.178
As for the CFTC, its purpose is to cultivate financially stable and
competitive markets while concurrently protecting consumers, the
public, market users and their funds from any type of fraud or unlawful
practice.179 The CFTC monitors derivative markets for potential
abuses and supervises a range of entities, including futures
commission merchants and swap execution facilities.180 To further the
CFTC’s qualification as a regulatory sandbox administrator, a United

173. About the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last
modified May 21, 2018).
174. Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton2017-12-11.
175. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding
DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-131.
176. Clayton, supra note 174.
177. See CRYPTO COMPANY, https://www.thecryptocompany.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
178. Michael Sheetz, The SEC’s Crackdown on Cryptocurrencies Is About to Get Serious,
Former Chairman Says, CNBC (Dec. 21, 2017, 6:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/21/seccrackdown-on-cryptocurrencies-is-about-to-get-serious-ex-chairman.html.
179. Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
180. Id.
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States district court judge in New York supported the CFTC’s
authority in regulating cryptocurrencies as commodities:
Virtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a
commodity. Virtual currencies are “goods” exchanged in a
market for a uniform quality and value . . . . They fall wellwithin the common definition of “commodity” as well as the
[Commodity Exchange Act’s] definition of “commodities”
as “all other goods and articles . . . [sic] in which contracts
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”181
With the CFTC gaining oversight over the futures market and the
underlying trading platform, its regulatory powers currently function
alongside, rather than in competition with, the SEC regulation
discussed above.182 The SEC does not have direct oversight of the
transactions in commodities, but some cryptocurrencies contain
attributions that characterize them as securities.183 For example, the
offer, sale, and trading aspects of these cryptocurrencies must adhere
to securities laws.184 Consequently, the SEC works to expose those
who threaten the integrity of the securities laws by means of evading
the registration, antifraud, and disclosure requirements.185 Both the
SEC and CFTC, along with other federal and state regulators and
criminal authorities, work collectively to bring transparency to the
markets and to deter fraud.186
Assuredly, this concept of federal oversight is already gaining
traction. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton addressed the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs at an open
session on February 6, 2018 on the topic of the SEC and CFTC’s
oversight role of virtual currencies:
It appears that many of the U.S.-based cryptocurrency
trading platforms have elected to be regulated as money181. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228 (E.D.N.Y.
2018); see also Wolfie Zhao, Cryptos Are Commodities, Rules US Judge in CFTC Case, COINDESK
(Mar. 7, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/us-judge-rules-cryptocurrencies-arecommodities-in-cftc-case/.
182. See Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are Looking at Cryptocurrency,
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-are-lookingat-cryptocurrency-1516836363.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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transmission services. Traditionally, from an oversight
perspective, these predominantly state-regulated payment
services have not been subject to direct oversight by the SEC
or the CFTC . . . . As Chairman Giancarlo, [the CFTC
chairman] and I, [Chairman Clayton], stated recently, we are
open to exploring with Congress, as well as with our federal
and state colleagues, whether increased federal regulation of
cryptocurrency trading platforms is necessary or appropriate.
We are also supportive of regulatory and policy efforts to
bring clarity and fairness to this space.187
U.S. regulators supported the SEC and CFTC chairmen’s statement
that Congress should consider federal oversight because
“cryptocurrency trading has outgrown the state-based regulation that
covers many platforms.”188 The chairmen acknowledged that the mere
patchwork attempt at regulation and the lack of a comprehensive
structure, provokes a necessary policy discussion.189 Although no
concrete changes came to fruition following the hearing, it sparked a
meaningful dialogue with U.S. regulators on the ineffectual medley of
state regulations and the possible step towards federal regulation.
The SEC and CFTC’s oversight and guidance in the financial
technology market is important and should be supplemented by efforts
to create an adaptable regulatory environment. As the cryptocurrency
market is quickly evolving, there is a pressing need for flexibility
within the market.190 Just as the United Kingdom, Australia,
Singapore, and Hong Kong did, either the SEC or CFTC should
institute a regulatory domain, such as the regulatory sandbox, that
fosters innovation, while maintaining their original mission of
protecting both the market and the consumers, and supporting the
principles of the investor.

187. Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 3 (Feb. 6, 2018) (statement of Jay Clayton),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clayton%20Testimony%202-6-18.pdf.
188. Dave Michaels & Gabriel T. Rubin, Patchy Bitcoin Oversight Poses Hazards for
Investors, Regulators Say, WALL STREET J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/patchy-bitcoinoversight-poses-hazards-for-investors-regulators-say-1517913001 (last updated Feb. 6, 2018,
11:38 AM).
189. Id.
190. See Clayton & Giancarlo, supra note 182.
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V. CONCLUSION
California should reject the proposed cryptocurrency legislation,
Assembly Bill 1123, that is modeled after New York’s BitLicense,
which has proven to be problematic and ineffective. Further, not only
is the legislation itself restrictive, potentially driving out
cryptocurrency businesses, but also the concept of each state having
its own respective regulation is inadequate when managing consumer
protection. The lack of a uniform legal framework deters
entrepreneurs and investors from participating in the cryptocurrency
realm, exacerbates problems of fraud and theft, and curtails
consumers’ confidence in the government’s efforts to protect their
economic interests.
The preferred path is for reform at the federal level. Several
countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, and
Hong Kong have developed regulatory sandboxes that can serve as a
guide. In each of these countries, a federal regulatory body has
retained responsibility for cryptocurrency oversight of the sandboxes:
Financial Conduct Authority, Australian Securities and Investments
Commission, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, respectively.
The United States consists of federal regulatory bodies that are
more than capable of managing a regulatory sandbox, particularly
either the Securities and Exchange Commission or the United States
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Both Commissions
presently oversee the financial market, and are familiar with
cryptocurrency regulation, as the almost instantaneous rise of virtual
currency forcefully demanded their attention.
The concept of the regulatory sandbox is admittedly still at a
nascent stage, but it is attracting innovation and investors. It enables
firms entering the financial services market to test their proposals in a
controlled environment without jeopardizing both the consumer and
the broader financial market. Implementing the regulatory sandbox, or
at least utilizing it as a framework for future regulation, can potentially
increase the United States’ marketability as a hub for innovation.
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